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Abstract: How do major powers use militaries to cope with diverse threats in a complex 
environment of costly conventional war, emerging power competition, as well as the persistent 
challenge of violent non-state actors?  I argue that multinational military exercises provide a tool 
for major powers to reduce the unpredictability of non-state threats as well as to weaken other 
powers through balancing and regime-promotion.  The number of multinational exercises has 
increased substantially since the Cold War, which is puzzling given the end of superpower rivalry 
and incentives to enjoy the peace dividend.  Textual analysis and regressions of over a thousand 
multinational military exercises from 1980-2016 reveal that major powers reacted to an increase in 
strategic uncertainty by implementing exercises as a means to combat ambiguous non-state threats.  
Yet as major power competition becomes more intense, I expect major powers to leverage these 
same types of exercises to undermine one another. 
 
    Although scholars disagree about how to accurately define the current international system,1 
one point seems clear: major powers must deal with a growing number of threats in what could 
be considered a “new era of upheaval.”2  The apparent return of great power competition is 
compounded by the seemingly unending threat of non-state actors that countries have struggled 
to defeat since the end of the Cold War.  At the same time, nuclear weapons and changing norms 
have increased the costs of interstate war3 and the US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan have 
revealed the limits of using military force against non-state actors.  In this complex environment 
of emerging competition, costly conventional war, as well as the persistent challenge of violent 
non-state actors, how do major powers use the military ‘tool’ to address these diverse threats?  I 
argue that multinational military exercises are and will remain a prominent means for major 
powers to manage both the unpredictability of non-state threats as well as to weaken other 
powers through balancing and regime-promotion. 
 
                                                          
1 Some argue that the distribution of capabilities is becoming more multipolar, while others argue that 
America’s economic and technological dominance will continue to dominate.  For an example of the former, see 
John J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2014); Randall 
Schweller, “Three Cheers for Trump’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2018), 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2018-08-13/three-cheers-trumps-foreign-policy.  For the latter, see 
Michael Beckley, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2018); Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, “The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers in the Twenty-
First Century: China’s Rise and the Fate of America’s Global Position,” International Security 40, no. 3 (Winter 
2015/2016): 7-53. 
2 Hal Brands and Eric Edelman, “America and the Geopolitics of Upheaval,” The National Interest, June 21, 
2017, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-the-geopolitics-upheaval-21258. 
3 Robert Jervis, “Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace,” American Political Science Review 96, 
no. 1 (March 2002): 1-14; John Mueller, “War Has Almost Ceased to Exist: An Assessment,” Political Science 
Quarterly 124, No. 2 (Summer 2009): 297-321; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power (New York, Public Affairs, 
2011), 29-33. 




    Over the last twenty-five years, military exercises have become an important foreign policy 
tool as the number of multinational training events increased substantially since the end of the 
Cold War despite the end of superpower rivalry (see Figure 1 below).  Although traditionally 
viewed as a means for armies to prepare for war or deter adversaries, states are increasingly 
using military training as an instrument of statecraft to influence both partners and rivals.  For 
instance, in the 1990’s the US used military exercises to encourage liberal values and recruit 
European partners for multilateral missions,4 while more recently Russia hosted military training 
to prevent terrorism and democratic revolution in neighboring states.5  Major powers often use 
these types of multinational training to address ambiguous non-state threats; however, they also 
can leverage exercises to compete with one another in an era in which interstate conventional 
war would produce enormous costs.   
    The intention of this article is twofold: first, to explore the concept of military statecraft in 
order to better understand how states use militaries to achieve political goals in a complex 
environment; second, to determine why multinational exercises increased after the end of US-
Soviet competition.  The dramatic rise of multilateral exercises since the end of the Cold War is 
puzzling: without the threat of great power war, the incentives to enjoy the ‘peace dividend’ and 
reduce military operations abroad were immense.6  Some may point to the internationally-active 
American grand strategy of liberal hegemony as a possible cause of this increase in US-led 
exercises,7 yet non-US major powers—including Russia, China, and India—also increased their 
use of multinational training sometime after the end of the Cold War.8  Moreover, this rise in 
multilateral exercises in the 1990s and 2000s actually coincided with a decrease in war, both 
interstate and intrastate.9  Yet in the decades following 1991, not only the US but all major 
powers expanded the number of multinational military exercises to meet or surpass Cold War-
levels.10  What explains this continual rise since the early 1990’s? 
                                                          
4 For a discussion of the origin and purpose of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, see James Goldgeier, 
Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 
26-29.  See also Michael Rühle and Nicholas Williams, “Partnership for Peace: A Personal View from NATO,” 
Parameters 24, no. 4 (1994): 66-75; “Partnership for Peace: Framework Document,” North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, original publication January 11, 1994, modified October 31, 2000, accessed January 7, 2017, 
https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/4995/c940110b.htm. 
5 See, for example, Erica Marat, The Military and the State in Central Asia: From Red Army to Independence 
(New York: Routledge, 2010), 94.  For a compressive discussion of Russian-led exercises with the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization, see Marcel De Haas, “War Games of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the 
Collective Security Treaty Organization: Drills on the Move!” The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 29, no. 3 (July 
2, 2016): 378–406. 
6 For an argument in favor of exploiting the peace dividend, see Jeane Kirkpatrick, “A Normal Country in a 
Normal Time,” National Interest (Fall 1990): 40-43. 
7 For a description of grand strategy of liberal hegemony or “deep engagement”, see Stephen G. Brooks, G. 
John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, “Don’t Come Home America: The Case Against Retrenchment,” 
International Security 37, no. 3 (Winter 2012/2013): 7-51.  Recent works that view liberal hegemony after the Cold 
War as sub-optimal and an overextension of US power include Stephen M. Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions: 
America’s Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of US Primacy (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018); John 
J. Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2018). 
8 A graph of exercises by each major power is included in the Appendix. 
9 Andrew Mack, “Global Political Violence: Explaining the Post-Cold War Decline,” Coping with Crisis 
Working Paper Series (International Peace Academy Publications, 2007). 
10 Though there are different terms describing military training, I interchangeably use ‘exercise’, ‘maneuver’, or 
‘training’ as opposed to other terms used by journalists, such as war games, which implies preparation for war 






Figure 1: Number of Land-Based Multinational Military Exercises per Year Involving a  
Major Power, 1980-2016, by Exercise Type. 11 
 
    I argue that major powers increased their use of multinational exercises after the end of the 
Cold War as a response to an increase in strategic uncertainty; that is, when the type and location 
of the threat is unknown, as well as whether other states will support operations to combat these 
threats.  The fall of the Soviet Union and the end of superpower rivalry, compounded with the 
destabilizing forces of globalization, presented military planners with a challenge: how to 
prepare for operations against an unknown threat.  As Figure 1 reveals, in the early 1990’s major 
powers began increasing the number of non-traditional ‘shaping’ military exercises: training 
events used not for traditional war rehearsals or deterrence, but instead to change the character of 
or relationship between states.  More specifically, major powers use these types of exercises to 
recruit allies, build the capacity of weaker armies, shape the role of partner forces, and even 
develop trust among adversaries.  I argue these types of exercises served as a rational means to 
reduce strategic uncertainty by influencing other militaries to help combat violent non-state 
threats, such as terrorism, ethnic war, and humanitarian disasters. 
    The prevalence of shaping exercises contrasts sharply with the final decade of the Cold War.  
Throughout this superpower rivalry, the US and Soviet Union operated globally, yet they 
                                                          
(which I categorize as only one type of military exercise).  By ‘multinational’, I refer to two or more states involved 
in the exercise.  A graph of exercises by major power are included in the Appendix.  As explained in the research 
design section, I include as major powers those delineated by the authors of the Correlates of War (CoW) State 
System Membership Project, which, from 1945-2016 include countries include the United States, Great Britain, 
France, Germany, Russia, China, and Japan.  However, I make two alterations: I remove Japan but include India due 
to Japan’s constitutional inability to deploy troops abroad (biasing against one type of exercise option) and India’s 
ranking as the third largest power according to CoW’s Composite Index of National Capabilities. 
11 My datasets are described in the Research Design section below. 




planned for conventional battle in Europe and supported proxies against each other’s partners in 
other regions of the world.12  These great powers used primarily traditional exercises—war 
rehearsals and deterrence—to both prepare for and prevent war against each other.  However, the 
rise of violent non-state actors after the dissolution of communist states presented planners with 
acute uncertainty about the nature of the threat and potential allies.  Non-traditional, cooperative 
military exercises were a solution to this problem.  Although these non-traditional exercises were 
a means to tackle the threat posed by non-state actors, since 2010 the US and Russia have 
revived the use of traditional exercises (rehearsals and deterrence) as great power rivalry has 
returned.  Moreover, major powers can leverage shaping against one another as a form of 
balancing by attracting allies and influencing the character of other militaries.  As conventional 
war is rare, yet the persistent threat of violent non-state actors seems unending, scholars and 
practitioners would benefit from a better understanding of the varied use of military power.   
    In order to test my argument, I first analyze US Army operational doctrine over the last three 
decades and conduct logit regressions using a new dataset of land-based, major power-led 
multinational exercises from 1980 to 2016.  I then expand the tests to include all current major 
powers.  The results reveal that a rise in strategic uncertainty about threats and partners led to an 
increase in the number and scope of exercises even when controlling for other explanations.  
This article proceeds in four stages.  First, I examine the concept of military statecraft and offer a 
typology of military exercises with a view toward traditional theories of military doctrine and 
power.  Second, I further describe my puzzle about the increase in multinational exercises since 
the end of the Cold War and elucidate my argument as well as the alternatives.  Third, I describe 
my research design and, fourth, I offer my statistical test results.  I conclude with a discussion 
about the future of exercises in world politics, especially given the apparent return of great power 
competition. 
 
Military Statecraft, Shaping Operations, and Multinational Exercises 
Military Statecraft in a Complex Environment 
    I define military statecraft as a state’s use of military means to achieve foreign policy 
ends.13  The military ‘tool’ is one among several available to states in achieving various goals—
the others being diplomacy, economics, and information using Lasswell’s classic framework 
                                                          
12 The assumption that the source and location of potential war during the Cold War was between NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact in Europe was prevalent in both policy and academic debates in the 1980’s.  For an example, see 
John J. Mearsheimer, Barry R. Posen, Eliot A. Cohen, Steven J. Zologa, Malcom Chalmers, and Lutz Unterseher, 
“Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment and the Tank Gap Data Flap,” International Security 13, No. 4 
(Spring 1989): 128-179.  Moreover, Lawrence Freedman notes that major power war-planning, “all took place 
within a cold-war context, in which the enemy was both well known and substantial, and the problem to be solved 
was deterring and if necessary resisting aggression across the inner German border.  The focus was therefore on a 
classic great power confrontation between large armies in the center of Europe.”  Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A 
History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 198-201. 
13 I use the term ‘foreign policy’ instead of ‘grand strategy’ since the goals of foreign policy are numerous (e.g. 
power, security, wealth, leadership, status, protecting human rights, alleviating human suffering) while the objective 
of grand strategy is usually achieving national security (however defined).  Thus, a state may use its military for 
non-security reasons, such as to increase its status globally, protect individuals from government repression, or to 
rescue foreigners during a natural disaster. 




(often organized into the acronym “DIME”).14  Yet my conceptualization is broader than more 
traditional uses of the concept that focus purely on the threat or use of force, which I argue is 
only one category of military activity.15  There are two main clusters of military means or ‘tools’ 
available to states: traditional operations and shaping operations.  Traditional operations 
encompass military activities designed to threaten or use violent force through coercive 
diplomacy16, deterrence, or actual combat.  These types of missions are widely explored in 
studies of military doctrine and military power, against both state and non-state threats.17   
    Shaping operations, by contrast, are military-led activities designed to influence both partners 
and rivals by changing the character of other armies or altering the relationship between 
militaries.  States often employ shaping as a non-warfighting, cooperative use of military force to 
proactively influence their environments to become more benign or favorable. States frequently 
use shaping to prevent war, usually through recruiting and training partners to provide stability in 
conflict-prone regions, but shaping can also be leveraged to gain an advantage over an opponent, 
such as through the supplying of friendly proxies against a rival state.18  Common shaping 
activities include military diplomacy through student officer exchanges and senior leader visits,19 
                                                          
14 Harold Laswell: Politics: Who Gets What, When, and How (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), 204-205; see 
also in Baldwin, 13. 
15 For instance, David Baldwin defines military statecraft as, “influence attempts relying primarily on violence, 
weapons, or force.”15  David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 14.  In 
a more recent work, Baldwin highlights the preoccupation with “military force” in the majority of IR scholarship on 
power, most of which assumes military statecraft is used as the threat or use of force.  David A. Baldwin, Power and 
International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 109-111, 178-188. 
16 Fearon shows how states can mobilize troops to signal resolve as a bargaining maneuver during crises.  James 
D. Fearon, “Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes,” The American Political 
Science Review 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 579-580. 
17 The major works on military doctrine include: Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, 
Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984); Jack Snyder, The Ideology 
of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 27; 
Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” International Security 9, 
no. 1 (Summer 1984): 58-107; Stephen Peter Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991); Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine 
Between the Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).  Regarding conventional military power, see 
Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2004).  For the use or threat of force against non-state actors in counterinsurgency, humanitarian intervention, 
and peacekeeping missions, see Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson III, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining 
Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” International Organization, Vol. 63, No. 1 (Winter, 2009): 67-106; Martha 
Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs of Intervention (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003); 
Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace Operations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 
18 In one of the few academic works on shaping operations, Derek Reveron views shaping as a form of “soft 
power” used to attract rather than coerce partners.  I agree that one goal of shaping is to attract other militaries 
through activities such as military diplomacy and security assistance, yet I argue that the goal of shaping can also be 
to undermine opponents through, for instance, proxy wars.  See Derek S. Reveron, “Shaping the Security 
Environment,” in Shaping the Security Environment, ed. Derek S. Reveron, (Newport: Naval War College Press, 
2007). 
19 Concerning student exchanges, see Carol Atkinson, Military Soft Power: Public Diplomacy through Military 
Educational Exchange, (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014); concerning workshops and seminars, see 
Alexandra Gheciu, “Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization?  NATO and the ‘New Europe’,” International 
Organization, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Autumn 2005): 973-1012.  For a counterargument which highlights the negative 
consequences of military officer exchanges, see Jesse Dillon Savage and Jonathan D. Caverley, “When Human 




security cooperation through arms sales and training,20 the forward presence of troops on foreign 
soil,21 among others.22  
    Shaping activities differ from traditional operations, such as offensive or defensive maneuvers, 
in that they are designed not to seize or protect territory against enemy troops, but to change 
other militaries’ patterns of behavior.  For instance, instead of intervening in a civil war, a state 
may choose to have its army train a partner force to combat insurgents in lieu of the state’s own 
military.  Shaping operations are also levied to change the relationship between militaries; for 
instance, from neutral states to coalition partners or from hostile to friendly.  Moreover, shaping 
operations part ways from deterrent operations as shaping is conducted before, during, and even 
after conventional operations take place: as deterrence is an attempt to convince an opponent that 
the costs of invasion outweigh the benefits, deterrence usually ends when major war operations 
begin.23  Although the US and Soviet Union used some forms of shaping during the Cold War—
particularly by providing arms and low-level training to proxies24–shaping operations became far 
more prominent after the end of the Cold War as the US began to grapple regional instability and 
humanitarian crises in Europe and Africa.25 
 
Military Exercises 
    Military exercises are a prominent tool of military statecraft that run the spectrum of both 
traditional (threat and use of force) and non-traditional (shaping) operations.  At the most basic 
level, military training prepares soldiers and units for combat or other types of missions.  
However, most militaries hold joint exercises with one another and states often use multinational 
exercises—those involving two or more states—as a means to influence others.  Multinational 
exercises vary extensively by number of participating troops and type of training tasks: large-
scale conventional maneuver exercises may include over 100,000 troops while small disaster 
relief training may involve only a few hundred soldiers.  Many exercises are conducted on a 
regular basis (such as annual and biannual), while others are conducted only as single events.  
According to US military doctrine, all multinational exercises—to varying degrees—seek to 
improve interoperability: that is, the ability for two or more military forces to execute each 
                                                          
Capital Threatens the Capitol: Foreign Aid in the Form of Military Training and Coups,” Journal of Peace Research 
Vol. 54, No. 4 (2017): 542-557. 
20 Derek S. Reveron, Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing 
Face of the US Military (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2016). 
21 Cooley and Daniel H. Nexon, “‘The Empire Will Compensate You’: The Structural Dynamics of the U.S. 
Overseas Basing Network,” Perspectives on Politics 11, no. 4 (2013): 1034-1050. 
22 Joseph Nye develops an alternative conceptualization of military power based on four ‘modalities’ or types of 
military action: fighting, coercive diplomacy, protection, and assistance.  Though useful for an updated, general 
understanding of military power, my framework is built on more specific operations grounded in military doctrine.  
Moreover, it is difficult to situate most shaping exercises—recruitment, role-forming, and trust-developing—within 
his framework.  Nye, The Future of Power, 29-45. 
23 Although there is some conceptual overlap between types, this distinction between operations—offensive, 
defensive, deterrent, and shaping—is described in Joint Operations, US Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, January 17, 2017), V-7 through V-13. 
24 For instance, see Lesley Gill, The School of the Americas: Military Training and Political Violence in the 
Americas (Durham: Duke University Press, 2004); John H. Coatsworth, “The Cold War in Central America, 1975-
1991,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 3, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 216-218. 
25 Reveron, “Shaping the Security Environment,” 1-5. 




other’s doctrine, conduct joint planning, and ensure that technologies are compatible.26  
However, multinational training events can be broken down into different types according to the 
primary function that they serve (Figure 2 below).27  Traditional types include deterrence and 
rehearsal exercises, while shaping types include recruitment, capacity-building, role-forming, 
and trust-developing exercises.  Thus, multinational exercises provide interesting variation, 
across time and space, which can inform us about the different ways states use military means to 
achieve their goals. 
    Traditional exercises, those intended for rehearsal and/or deterrence,28 are sometimes 
mentioned in the traditional works in military doctrine and statecraft.29  Rehearsals are 
conducted in order to test whether allies or coalition partners are properly prepared for an 
upcoming or potential mission, which can include war, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, 
disaster relief, or other tasks charged to the military.  Rehearsals may be used to practice 
mobilizations for invasions or counterattacks, such as the Russian Kavkaz-2008 or Zapad-2013 
exercises, while others may prepare militaries and other governmental agencies for humanitarian 
crises, such as the European Union’s MILEX planning and training events.30  Rehearsals also 
include exercises designed to test emerging doctrine, as demonstrated by Imperial Germany’s 
annual Kriegsspiel that allowed senior army officers to experiment with different operational 
concepts at the turn of the twentieth century.31   
    Deterrence exercises are conducted by two or more states that seek to convince an opponent 
that the costs of attack outweigh the benefits, either through denial or punishment.  Military 
exercises signal deterrence in two ways: (1) by denial through the showcasing of capabilities that 
would make invasion too costly and (2) by punishment through performing tasks that 
demonstrate the military’s ability to counterattack across borders as a response to an invasion.32  
Armies may use exercises to signal both immediate and general deterrence: in times of 
immediate crisis, a military exercise can send a clear signal of capability and resolve to a specific 
opponent.  For general deterrence, military training can also be used to “maintain a broad 
                                                          
26 Multinational Operations, US Joint Publication 3-16 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 
16, 2013), I-9. 
27 This typology was developed in Kyle Wolfley, “Training Not to Fight: How Major Powers Use Multinational 
Military Exercises to Reduce Strategic Uncertainty,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 2018. 
28 In one of the few academic works on military exercises, Blackwill and Legro do not separate training 
functions by rehearsal or deterrence but point to both of these functions as objectives in NATO and Warsaw Pact 
exercises during the Cold War; see Robert D. Blackwill and Jeffrey W. Legro, “Constraining Ground Force 
Exercises of NATO and the Warsaw Pact,” International Security 14, no. 3 (Winter 1989/1990): 68-98. 
29 For instance, Jack Snyder highlights the role that map and field exercises served in allowing the German army 
to rehearse war plans before World War I, while Stephen Rosen discusses how exercise serve as a way for militaries 
to test doctrine.  See Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, 141-147; Rosen, Winning the Next War, 68-75. 
30 Pauli Järvenpää, Zapad-2013: A View from Helsinki, August 2014 (Washington D.C.: The Jamestown 
Foundation, 2014), 1-6; “Press Release: EU Military Exercise 2007 (MILEX 07) to be conducted from 7-15 June 
2007,” Press Release from the Council of the European Union, June 4, 2007, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/94472.pdf. 
31 For a discussion of how (unilateral) exercises serve as opportunities to evaluate and improve doctrine, see 
Nina Kollars, “Genius and Mastery in Military Innovation,” Survival 59, no. 2 (2017): 125-138. 
32 I borrow the language of deterrence by punishment and denial from Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and 
Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 14-16.  Snyder 
attributes this distinction to Robert E. Osgood, “A Theory of Deterrence,” unpublished manuscript, 1960. 




military capability” and discourage any opponent from contemplating attack.33  Annual exercises 
‘Foal Eagle’ and ‘Team Spirit’ between the US and South Korea are examples of maneuvers 
intended to deter an invasion from North Korea.34  Of course, one military exercise can serve 
both functions of deterrence and rehearsal, as was the case for NATO REFORGER and Warsaw 
Pact exercises during the Cold War35; however, this combination of the two functions is not 
necessary, such as exercises in preparation for deployments to an active war zone or 
peacekeeping mission. 
    Shaping exercises, conversely, serve other purposes beyond mere threatening or using force; 
states leverage these types of exercises in order influence how two armies relate or to alter the 
character of an army, which ultimately reduces strategic uncertainty (explained below).  There 
are four types of shaping exercises: recruitment, capacity-building, role-forming, and trust-
developing.  States use recruitment exercises to convince partners to join a multilateral mission 
or to build relationships with potential allies.  States are incentivized to gain the diplomatic or 
military support of other states for multilateral missions, as long as the time horizon and 
operational commitment allow.36  Recruitment exercises attempt to attract partners by not only 
convincing the government (including the military) to join a coalition, but also by persuading the 
population that this partnership is beneficial for the country.37  This attempt to attract partners by 
persuading the population to join a mission could be considered a form of public diplomacy, one 
type of ‘soft power’ described by Nye.38  By gaining the support of other militaries, major 
powers seek to reduce the uncertainty associated with which states will offer assistance to these 
types of missions.  Moreover, major powers may use recruitment exercises simply to build 
stronger relations with other states and create more certainty about which states are friendly and 
which are threatening.  NATO’s Partnership for Peace program during the 1990’s is an example 
of an exercise program designed to recruit future members as well as partners for a potential 
peacekeeping mission in the Balkans.  States may also use military exercises to attract and 
practice with potential allies as a form of balancing against an adversary.39  The US military’s 
closer military cooperation with India and China’s training with Pakistan could be early attempts 
to attract allies against one another.40 
                                                          
33 For a discussion of the difference between general and immediate deterrence, see Patrick M. Morgan, 
Deterrence Now, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 9.  See also Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence: A 
Conceptual Analysis, (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1983). 
34 Vito D’Orazio, “War Games: North Korea’s Reaction to US and South Korean Military Exercises,” Journal 
of East Asian Studies 12 (2012): 275-294. 
35 For an in-depth discussion of NATO and Warsaw Pact exercises during the Cold War, see Robert D. 
Blackwill and Jeffrey W. Legro, “Constraining Ground Force Exercises of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.” 
36 Sarah E. Kreps, Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions After the Cold War (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
37 According to a senior planner for NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, this was one of the goals for these 
types of exercises with former Warsaw Pact members.  Anonymous former US official at NATO familiar with 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, phone interview by author, July 26, 2017. 
38 Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power, 100-109. 
39 See Robert Ross, “Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and Balancing in East 
Asia,” Security Studies 15, no.3 (July-September 2006): 389-391. 
40 Franz-Stefan Gady, “India, US, and Japan Conclude ‘Malabar’ Military Exercise,” The Diplomat, June 19, 
2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/06/india-us-and-japan-conclude-malabar-military-exercise/.  Ankit Panda, 
“China, Pakistan Conclude Bilateral Counterterrorism Exercises,” The Diplomat, January 8, 2019, 
https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/china-pakistan-conclude-bilateral-counterterrorism-exercises/. 




    Capacity-building exercises are intended to increase the capability of a partner army to 
provide its own security and preclude the need for future intervention.  By assisting with the 
training and mentorship necessary to carry out their own operations, major power militaries seek 
to reduce the uncertainty of threats emanating from fragile regions.41  Moreover, major powers 
hope that the capabilities of the partner are increased to the degree that future intervention 
becomes unnecessary.  Thus, major powers ‘delegate’ responsibility to these fragile partners.  
British support for the Royal Sierra Leonean Armed Forces in the 2000’s is an example of this 
type of training program.42 
    Role-forming exercises are a state’s means to alter what role that army serves for its society: 
for instance, whether that army will protect its regime from internal threats or deploy abroad for 
peacekeeping missions.43  By encouraging certain practices during exercises, such as respect for 
international law or stability through repression, major power militaries hope to create 
expectations of military behavior and reduce the uncertainty of the source of threats.  By 
influencing the role these partners serve for their societies, major powers hope that these non-
allies will become friendlier to the major power’s interests in the future.  Russian-led exercises in 
the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) designed to train former Soviet Republic 
armies how to prevent violent revolutions serves as an example of this type of training. 
    Trust-developing exercises are a state’s attempt to build trust and confidence between rival 
militaries in order to prevent inadvertent war.  Though major power rivals view each other with 
suspicion, if they are not engaged in open hostility they often will attempt to ameliorate tensions 
and build friendly relations.  Major power rivals attempt to prevent the onset of accidental war 
through joint training by altering their soldiers’ perceptions of one another to be viewed as more 
‘human’ than adversarial.  As rival soldiers interact along contested borders, on the seas, or in 
proxy states, major powers hope these individuals or units can de-escalate crises by not assuming 
the worst of intentions in one another but cooperate to find a mutual solution.  The rise of non-
state threats such as terrorism provides a suitable excuse for major power rivals to cooperate.  
Annual “Hand-in-Hand” exercises between China and India since 2006 offer an example of 
trust-developing exercises.44  Figure 2 below provides a typology of military exercise types as 
well as how the exercise is used as a means of statecraft. 
 
                                                          
41 Kathleen J. McInnis and Nathan J. Lucas, “What is ‘Building Partner Capacity?’ Issues for Congress,” 
Congressional Research Service, December 18, 2015, pg. 5, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44313.pdf.  Robert M. 
Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of U.S. Security Assistance,” Foreign Affairs 89, no. 3 
(May/June 2010): 2-6. Peter Dombrowski and Simon Reich, “The Strategy of Sponsorship,” Survival 57, no. 5 
(September 3, 2015): 121-148. 
42 Peter Albrecht and Paul Jackson, Securing Sierra Leone, 1997-2013: Defence, Diplomacy, and Development 
in Action, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (Abingdon, Oxford: Routledge Journals, 
2014). 
43 The ‘roles’ that militaries serve for their societies are described in Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster, and 
Andrew Cottey, “Armed Forces and Society: A Framework for Analysis,” in Soldiers and Societies in 
Postcommunist Europe, eds. Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster, and Andrew Cottey, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2003), 8-15. 
44 For example: “India, China to Hold First-Ever Army Exercises in December,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, 
November 21, 2007, LexisNexis Academic. 








Goal of Exercise Mechanism of Influence/ 
Uncertainty Reduction 
Rehearsal Traditional Win war or achieve 
mission success with 
partners 
Increase the joint readiness of troops, equipment, 
and doctrine 
Deterrence Traditional Prevent undesirable 
behavior from rivals 
Convince opponent that costs of invasion 
outweigh benefits 
Recruitment Shaping Secure help from others 
against state or non-state 
actors 
Encourage and prepare partners for alliance 
membership, multilateral mission, or potential 
conflict.  Reduce uncertainty of allied assistance. 
Capacity-
Building 
Shaping Delegate mission to other 
states to combat non-state 
actors  
Strengthen partner to provide own security or 
participate in regional missions.  Reduce 
uncertainty of threat emergence. 
Role-
Forming 
Shaping Change behavior of other 
militaries 
Influence character of partner military to fulfill 
particular roles and develop certain practices.  
Reduce uncertainty of threat emergence. 
Trust-
Developing 
Shaping Prevent war with rivals Change perceptions from hostile to friendly to 
prevent escalation of hostilities.  Reduce 
uncertainty of threat emergence. 
Figure 2: Typology of Multinational Military Exercises 
 
The Puzzle and Argument 
    As revealed in Figure 1 above, overall multinational military exercises involving at least one 
major power increased substantially in the mid-1990’s.  Although common during the last 
decade of the Cold War, this behavior is puzzling given the incentives for major powers to enjoy 
the peace dividend by focusing on domestic issues and reducing defense spending after the 
conclusion of superpower rivalry.  As represented in Figure 3 below, another puzzling feature of 
this phenomenon is that major powers began increasing training with non-allies.  By allies I refer 
to permanent, defense-pact signatories (formal alliances) as well as mission-based (‘ad-hoc’) 
coalition partners.45  Training with these types of partners is commonsensical: they allow major 
powers and partners to practice interoperability and usually serve the functions of deterrence, 
rehearsal, or both.  However, major powers have increasingly conducted exercises with non-
allies, which fall into one of the following categories: (1) partners that are not treaty allies or ad-
hoc coalition partners; (2) defense pact signatories that do not actually operate together in 
missions or attempt to deter an adversary.46  Exercises with non-allies (even rivals) is 
                                                          
45 For defense-pact signatories, I use “Type I” formal defense pacts according to the Correlates of War 
typology; see Douglas M. Gibler, International Military Alliances, 1648-2008, Volume 2, (Washington D.C.: CQ 
Press, 2009).  A list of ground-based multilateral coalitions that I apply in my dataset from 1980-2016 is listed in 
Appendix B. 
46 I include in this group Russia and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) since the CSTO 
represents more of a security organization intended to regulate member behavior and respond to non-state threats, 
since there have been no CSTO deployments since the organization’s inception and the Central Asian states are of 




counterintuitive given the opportunity costs of training with weaker partners, the incentives to 
hide military doctrine and technology from untrustworthy militaries, and the need to abide by the 
military imperatives of deception and surprise against rivals.   
 
 
Figure 3: Number of Land-Based MMEs per Year Involving a Major Power, Including Either 




    Given the incentives against increasing multinational exercises (especially with non-allies), I 
argue that major powers increased the number of military exercises after the end of superpower 
rivalry for two reasons.  First, both government officials and military officers viewed military 
exercises as an effective means to reduce strategic uncertainty, which increased substantially 
after the end of the Cold War.  By strategic uncertainty I refer to a lack of predictability in 
forecasting potential threats and partners, which creates problems for military planning.  This 
increase in strategic uncertainty was the product of the rise of violent non-state actors wrought 
by the collapse of communism and forces of globalization, which forced military planners and 
leaders to develop a means to proactively influence their environments in order to prevent 
instability and surprise.  Second, military exercises continued to proliferate due to the habitual 
nature of military training and relationships.  As previously stated, training is necessary for all 
militaries to prepare for combat; exercises are conducted on a regular basis to train and test the 
                                                          
little use for deterrence against NATO. See Gregory Gleason and Marat E. Shaihutdinov, “Collective Security and 
Non-State Actors in Eurasia,” International Studies Perspectives 6 (2005): 274-284. 




readiness of units.  Many, but not all, MMEs are held on an annual, biannual, or quadrennial 
basis.  As major powers begin military relationships with other states, these partnerships 
sometimes last beyond the initial exercise as major powers view these continuing relationships as 
positive for national security.  Thus, like military training in general, MMEs are inherently 
‘sticky’, creating a cumulative effect as military relations continue over time. 
 
Strategic Uncertainty and Military Planning     
    Uncertainty presents an acute problem for military planning, both before and during conflict.  
Militaries attempt to minimize uncertainty through reconnaissance and the collection of 
intelligence, which provide information about potential enemies and battlefields.  Military 
planners incorporate numerous variables into their plans, including geography, weather, history, 
civilian considerations, enemy composition, as well as the capabilities of their own forces and 
allies (among a host of other variables), in order to gain an advantage and reduce unpredictability 
during battle.47  Yet war’s inherent uncertainty results in the inability for planners to confidently 
predict the outbreak, outcome, and consequences of conflict.48  Even before large-scale 
conventional war, when planners are confident about which enemy they will be facing and the 
general direction in which to anticipate attack, a level of uncertainty still remains about how the 
battle will ensue.  For instance, French military planners before World War I were unsure about 
whether the German army would invade through Belgium or the Alsace-Lorraine; decisions 
about where to position forces and whether to conduct counteroffensives were tied to this 
uncertainty.49 
    The problem of strategic uncertainty for military planning becomes even more severe when 
threats and assistance are unknown.  Especially given the unpredictable nature of non-state 
threats (such as terrorism and transnational crime) as well as expansive potential locations of 
threats (e.g. failed states, overpopulated cities, impoverished regions), military planners are faced 
with a complex strategic environment.  When militaries are unsure about who is a threat, from 
where threats will emanate, and who will be an ally against these threats, they are unable to 
properly plan for contingencies and develop an appropriate conventional doctrine to address this 
uncertainty.  I argue that militaries face strategic uncertainty from two sources: (1) threats (who 
is a threat and from where does it emanate); (2) assistance (who will provide support in 
addressing these threats).  Militaries may be uncertain about two aspects of threats: namely, their 
character and location.  First, military planners assess the ‘who’ of threats: whether danger will 
originate from state conventional (and nuclear) adversaries, non-state insurgents, transnational 
criminals, or natural disasters.  Second, uncertainty may also arise from an inability to predict the 
location of threats, especially in regards to violent non-state actors, pandemics, or natural 
disasters.  Military planners are concerned about the assistance they receive from others: whether 
potential allies will contribute to multilateral missions and whether fragile militaries are capable 
and willing to provide security for themselves.  In order to address these two sources of 
                                                          
47 See, for instance, Joint Planning, US Joint Publication 5-0 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
June 16, 2017), IV-10 through IV-14. 
48 Concerning the inability to predict the outcomes of war, see Jonathon Kirshner, “Rationalist Explanations for 
War?” Security Studies 10, no. 1 (Autumn 2000): 143-150.  See also Jonathon Kirshner, “The Economic Sins of 
Modern IR Theory and the Classical Realist Alternative,” World Politics 67, no. 1 (January 2015): 155-183. 
49 Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, 41-48. 




uncertainty that increased after the end of the Cold War, military planners increased the number 
of shaping operations. 
 
The Rise in Strategic Uncertainty after the Cold War 
    The end of the Cold War resulted in the rise of non-state threats beginning in the early 1990’s, 
which was a function of two main sources: (1) the collapse of communism and (2) the 
consequences of globalization.  Though the end of the Cold War marked the conclusion of the 
prospect for great power war, the lack of incentives to bolster client states as a buffer against an 
adversary’s sphere of influence produced significant effects.  Kalyvas and Balcells argue that 
although the number of civil war onsets declined after 1991, the end of the Cold War changed 
the relationship between the two great powers and their clients: without the need to counter each 
other’s influence, both the US and Russia limited or withdrew their funding in peripheral 
regions, causing the loss of state capacity, proliferation of weapons, and civil wars.50  Another 
major source of new threats spawned from the consequences of globalization: Mary Kaldor 
argues that ‘new wars’—conflicts that are fought by public militaries and private citizens over 
identity politics and blur conventional war, organized crime, and violations of human rights—
arose from the impacts of globalization.  She argues that new wars emerge from the loss of 
political sovereignty and autonomy as well as the disintegration of states; without a monopoly 
over the legitimate use of force, states with little capacity are challenged to maintain order and 
provide security for their citizens.51 
 
    The threats that emerged from the fall of communism and consequences of globalization 
posed unique problems for military planners since the threat type (state vs. non-state) and 
location were largely unknown.  Although the threat of great power war imposed a shadow over 
the Cold War, the source and location of both conventional and unconventional proxy threats 
were relatively known.  In contrast, terrorism, ethnic war, transnational crime, and resource 
scarcity could arise suddenly and from many parts of the world.  Mikkel Rasmussen argues that, 
“Globalisation means that Western strategy is increasingly focused on managing risks rather than 
creating enduring security.  Following the Cold War, this has meant a gradual recalibrating of 
doctrines from logic of deterrence to a management logic.”52  As the strategic environment 
moved from “predictability to unpredictability”, Western strategists were forced to transition 
away from a reliance on containment against the Soviets when “international security was 
                                                          
50 Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, “International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of 
the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict,” American Political Science Review 104, No. 3 (August 2010): 421-423.  
The authors contest the notion that the end of the Cold War had no impact on civil wars by showing how the 
technologies of rebellion (guerrilla vs. symmetric non-conventional) as well as the geographic location of rebellion 
changed.  Supporting the first argument, see James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War,” 
American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 75-86.  
51 Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2012). Additional works of the impact of globalization and non-state threats on state security include Jonathan 
Kirshner ed., Globalization and National Security (New York: Routledge, 2006); Robert O. Keohane, “The 
Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and the ‘Liberalism of Fear’.” Dialog-International 
Organization (Spring 2002): 29-43; Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and International 
Terrorism,” International Security 27, no. 3 (Winter 2002/2003): 30-58. 
52 Mikkel Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War: Terror, Technology and Strategy in the Twenty-First Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 95. 




predictable and calculable.”  Rather, after the end of the Cold War strategists adopted a 
‘meteorologist’ mentality as an attempt to predict and hedge against an unpredictable security 
environment.53  
 
    My argument holds that shaping exercises have proliferated since the end of the Cold War due 
to an increase in strategic uncertainty, wrought by the rise in non-state threats.  Though the risk 
of high-intensity, conventional war was high during the Cold War, the source (state actors) and 
location (Europe) were generally known by strategic planners.54 However, especially since the 
end of the Cold War, major power militaries have increasingly struggled to predict the source 
and location from which threats will emanate.  US senior military leaders have emphasized this 
growing uncertainty.  The US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff asked the graduating class of 
the National Defense University in 2016: “In the environment we are in today, with the 
complexity and volatility and variety of challenges we have, how do we assess risk? ... How do 
we assess the capabilities or capacities that must exist in the joint force?  A part of this is also 
how to prepare for the unexpected.”55  Comparing the current strategic environment to the Cold 
War, US Army Pacific Commander General Robert Brown noted in a recent interview:  
It's amazing how complex the world has become. I often would joke, 'The last 
time I was bored was in the Cold War.' I was a company commander, and I had a 
responsibility in an area against the Soviets. You know, they could have come 
across but you kind of knew they wouldn't be that crazy. We had learned to fight 
outnumbered and win. We had almost 300,000 in Europe. We trained hard, but 
there was still time to get bored. I have not been bored since, and I don't think 




This concern about unpredictability is also manifest in most current US military operational 
doctrine: 
The strategic environment is uncertain, complex, and can change rapidly, 
requiring military leaders to maintain persistent military engagement with 
multinational partners…The strategic environment is fluid, with continually 
changing alliances, partnerships, and national and transnational threats that 
rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge.  While it is impossible to predict 
                                                          
53 Ibid., 95-105. 
54 The assumption that the source and location of potential war during the Cold War was between NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact in Europe was prevalent in both policy and academic debates in the 1980’s.  For an example, see 
John J. Mearsheimer, Barry R. Posen, Eliot A. Cohen, Steven J. Zologa, Malcom Chalmers, and Lutz Unterseher, 
“Correspondence: Reassessing Net Assessment and the Tank Gap Data Flap,” International Security, Vol. 13, No. 4 
(Spring 1989): 128-179. 
55 Jim Garamone, “Dunford Details Implications of Today’s Threats on Tomorrow’s Strategy,” US Department 
of Defense News, August 23, 2016, accessed August 26, 2017, 
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/923685/dunford-details-implications-of-todays-threats-on-
tomorrows-strategy/. 
56 Derek Grossman, “General Robert Brown on the U.S. Army’s Role in Asia,” The RAND Blog, October 25, 
2017, accessed January 19, 2018, https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/10/general-robert-brown-on-the-us-armys-role-
in-asia.html. 




precisely how challenges will emerge and what form they might take, we can 
expect that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will persist.57   
In order to effectively deal with these types of unpredictable and sometimes unknowable threats, 




State-Centric Approach to Military Statecraft 
 
    My argument concerning the rise of shaping operations assumes a ‘state-centric’ approach to 
military statecraft: I presume that states—comprised of central decision-makers such as 
executive national leaders, militaries, and foreign ministries—act as rational, unitary actors apart 
from the private interests of bureaucracies and organizations.  This framework assumes that in 
the realms of foreign policy, security, and defense, government officials that lead major military 
and foreign bureaucracies commonly act in pursuance of goals set by national leaders.58  Thus, I 
expect that militaries generally pursue national (as opposed to private, bureaucratic) interests, of 
which security is a vital state goal.  I make this simplifying assumption for an important reason: 
the conclusion of the Cold War resulted in a complex security environment in which civilian 
leaders and diplomats often relied on military power to address strategic uncertainty.  
Government leaders and military officers shared an interest in combating these ambiguous 
threats and, given the blurring of ‘war’ and ‘peace’, the former largely delegated this task to the 
latter.59  Thus, since civilian policymakers sought to reduce strategic uncertainty and expected 
the military to accomplish this task, interests largely converged.  However, there are three main 
challenges to my argument and assumptions, described below. 
 
Alternative Explanations 
    There are two alternatives that challenge my account of the rise of shaping operations after the 
end of the Cold War.  First, perhaps militaries use shaping operations to procure greater 
organizational benefits, such as size, wealth, prestige, and autonomy.  This explanation is 
supported by some of the most prominent works in military doctrine.  From this perspective, 
armies favor certain doctrines in order to reduce organizational uncertainty on the battlefield and 
to increase the military’s prestige and morale, its organizational size and wealth, and its 
autonomy from civilian oversight.60  Because armies often pursue doctrines that are harmful to a 
state’s political goals, civilian government officials are forced to intervene and change a 
                                                          
57 Joint Operations, US Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 17, 
2017), I-2 through I-3. 
58 My use of a state-centric approach is derived from Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw 
Materials Investments and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 10-12, 26-27; my 
approach is also similar to M. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s 
Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 13-14. 
59 This understanding of civil-military relations in an era of ambiguous, non-state threats aligns with that of 
Rosa Brooks, How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything: Tales from the Pentagon (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 2016). 
60 Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, 24-34; Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins 
of the First World War,” International Security 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 61-63; Posen, The Sources of Military 
Doctrine, 41-51. 




military’s doctrine to better align with the state’s grand strategy.61  Failure to intervene in unwise 
military doctrine can result in disintegrated foreign policy or, as was the case prior to World War 
I, even great power war.62  These traditional works borrow heavily from organization theory and 
bureaucratic politics to explain why militaries behave in ways counter to their governments’ 
goals.63  Thus, major power militaries may have used military exercises in the 1990’s and 2000’s 
in order to serve these parochial interests rather than achieve the ends of grand strategy 
established by civilian officials.   
    Second, shaping exercises may have served as an opportunity for major powers to 
institutionalize cooperation among allies.  Celeste Wallander, for instance, argues that exercises 
comprise a key element of NATO’s integrated military command, which served as a specific 
asset that allowed the alliance to survive in the mid-1990s after the threat of the Soviet Union 
dissipated.64  In this sense, major powers may use military exercises to deepen relations with 
allies.  These alternative explanations will be tested in the quantitative tests below. 
 
Research Design and Results 
Research Design: Textual Analysis and Large-N Regression 
   In order to test my argument, I use textual analysis and multinomial logit models of dyads 
between major powers and every other state in the international system from 1980 to 2016.  My 
outcome variable—exercise type, a nominal categorical variable—is the probability of 
conducting a certain type of exercise, which assumes one of three values: no exercise, a 
traditional exercise, or a shaping exercise.  I derive observations from a new dataset of over 
1,000 major power-led, land-based multinational military exercises from 1980 to 2016 that codes 
each major training event by date, participant states, training tasks, number of troops, exercise 
type, alliance or security organization involved, exercise program, and, if available, when the 
exercise program began.  Each exercise was reported in the news or announced by a military 
public affairs office.   
    I include only land-based multinational military exercises in order to separate actual exercises 
from workshops, seminars, or computer-simulated exercises65; I also exclude air, air defense, and 
naval exercises.  I exclusively test land-based exercises for both substantive and methodological 
reasons.  First, I focus on land armies since, as John Mearsheimer argues, controlling land is the, 
                                                          
61 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 51-54. 
62 Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War,” 58-107; Jack 
Snyder, “Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984,” International Security 9, no. 1 
(Summer 1984): 109-110. 
63 The original organizational and bureaucratic politics models are described in Graham T. Allison, Essence of 
Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971); see also Morton H. Halperin, Priscilla 
A. Clapp, and Arnold Kantor, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution 
Press, 2006).  In terms of Allison’s models, there is considerable overlap between the organizational and 
bureaucratic models’ expectations of organizational behavior: see Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond, 
“Rethinking Allison’s Models,” American Political Science Review 86, no. 2 (June 1992): 301-322.  The traditional 
works tend to include expectations from both models when explaining parochial military behavior. 
64 Celeste Wallander, “Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War,” International 
Organization 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2000): 714. 
65 As opposed to computer-simulated and staff exercises, land-based exercises are financially costly and require 
trade-offs by the participating militaries.  Moreover, it is hard to imagine that staff exercises effectively signal 
deterrence.   




“supreme political objective in a world of territorial states.  Naval and air forces are simply not 
suited for conquering territory.”66  Moreover, the traditional works in military doctrine and 
power primarily focus on landpower, which allows me to test my argument against the 
alternative suggested by these works.67  Second, although most states have at least a standing 
army, not all states have an air or naval force, which would bias the dyad observation away from 
these states.68  Additionally, naval and air training exercises are sometimes difficult to 
distinguish from actual operations in the global commons (against, for instance, pirates, which 
would be actual combat patrols instead of practice for combat).69 I borrow most observations 
from a dataset compiled by Vito D’Orazio, but code more exercises and re-code some of his 
observations to reflect exercise type, training task, number of troops, organization or alliance 
involved, and exercise program history.70  Every exercise is coded by ‘type’, which I determined 
by observing several indicators for each exercise: tasks that were trained, named ‘threat’ during 
the exercise, number and type of troops, official and journalistic accounts, and exercise program 
type and history.71   
    I then organize these observations into about 40,000 (directed) dyad years72 between each 
major power and every other state in the international system using the EUGene software 
                                                          
66 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), 
86.  Chapter 4 provides a longer justification of his argument. 
67 For instance, in Military Power Stephen Biddle’s case studies and data are comprised of only land operations, 
or as he expresses: “By ‘continental warfare’ I mean combat fought between military forces on or over major land 
masses.  I thus exclude war at sea, and strategic bombing against civilian targets.”  See Biddle, Military Power, 6.  
The majority of the case studies for the traditional works analyze land-based armies (see footnotes 12-19 for 
examples of the traditional works in military doctrine and power). 
68 For instance, according to the Military Balance, out of 48 states in Sub-Saharan Africa, only 40 states have an 
“air force” or “air wing” and only 26 states have a “navy” or “maritime wing”.  See “Chapter Nine: Sub-Saharan 
Africa,” The Military Balance 118, no. 1 (2018): 429-498. 
69 For instance, the Indian military announced that the Indian and Indonesian navies were simultaneously 
conducting a “coordinated patrol” to maintain open shipping lanes as well as a “bilateral maritime exercise,” both in 
the Andaman Sea.  See “Coordinated Patrol and India-Indonesia Bilateral Maritime Exercise Commence at 
Belawan, Indonesia,” Indian Navy, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Accessed October, 14, 2018, 
https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/content/coordinated-patrol-and-india-indonesia-bilateral-maritime-exercise-
commence-belawan.  Another example is when the Australian military responded to Russian bombers that were 
either conducting an “exercise” or a “mission” over neutral waters.  See Christopher Knaus, “Australian Air Force 
Put on High Alert after Russian Long-Range Bombers Headed South,” The Guardian, December 29, 2017, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/30/australian-military-alert-russia-bombers-indonesia-exercises. 
70 Vito D’Orazio, “Joint Military Exercises: 1970-2010 [dataset],” http://www.vitodorazio.com/data.html.  
D’Orazio’s data was originally collected as part of his dissertation project; see Vito D’Orazio, “International 
Military Cooperation: From Concepts to Constructs” (Ph.D. dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 2013). 
71 Coding criteria are available in the appendix. 
72 Although the use of dyads in political science has come under recent scrutiny, I argue that my use of dyad-
years is valid for two reasons.  First, because I only include directed-dyads between seven major powers and the 
other states in the international system, I avoid issues concerned with interdependence between states commonly 
found in regular dyad datasets.  In other words, the variation is largely with the partner, not the entire major power-
partner dyad.  Although I group all major powers together for most of my tests in this chapter, the appendix provides 
robustness checks for each individual major power.  Second, although splitting multilateral events into bilateral 
events could be problematic, I argue that MMEs are different from other major multinational events, such as wars or 
treaties.  That is, I believe there is little difference between bilateral and multilateral exercises: an exercise between 
the US and Ghana or one between the US, Ghana, and other Asian and European partners are largely similar.  
Moreover, these exercises are not as costly as war or treaties: militaries look forward to opportunities to send troops 
for training, even among rival countries.  More importantly, without the use of partner-years, I would be consciously 
selecting on the dependent variable (MMEs that actually occur) and unable to observe the variation between partners 




developed by Scott Bennett and Allan Stam.73  Though the concept of ‘major power’ carries 
different interpretations, I include as major powers those delineated by the authors of the 
Correlates of War State System Membership Project, which is essentially a state that has certain 
capabilities and behaviors reminiscent of a major power (agreed upon by the coders).74  From 
1945-2016, these countries include the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, 
China, and Japan.  However, I make two caveats to this list: (1) though Japan may be considered 
an economic major power, I exclude the country due to its constitutional inability to project 
military force outside of its borders75; (2) I include India, which, as of the most recent Correlates 
of War National Material Capabilities (NMC) list, had the third highest Composite of National 
Capabilities (CINC) behind the US and China and the fourth largest military in 2012.76  In order 
to be included as a partner, a state’s military must comprise at least 1,000 troops, which I argue 
is the least amount of total national troops possible for a state to be considered a potential 
exercise-partner.  Less than 1,000 national troops would call into a question a state’s ability to 
manage military tasks both at home and send soldiers to international exercises.77 
   Though ostensibly ambiguous, I code my primary explanatory variable—strategic 
uncertainty—using two indicators: one specifically for the US and the other for all major 
powers.  My first indicator— ‘doctrinal uncertainty’—is the perceived uncertainty expressed in 
US Army operational doctrine.  The US Army’s capstone operations manual, published about 
once or twice a decade, serves as the organization’s formal statement of its military doctrine.78  
Each version sets out the Army’s primary purpose, potential threats, and a description of how the 
Army plans for its forces to be employed (operating concept).  From 1976-2012, the US Army 
published seven versions of its operations manual as either Field Manual (FM) 100-5, FM 3-0, or 
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0.79  Figure 4 below describes each version of the Army’s 
                                                          
that are chosen for exercises and those that are not; thus, I would not be able to capture the counterfactual ‘non-
MME’ and would consequently lose leverage over my argument. For a major critique of the use of dyads (which 
guides my two points in defense), see Paul Poast, “Dyads Are Dead, Long Live Dyads!  The Limits of Dyadic 
Designs in International Relations Research,” International Studies Quarterly 60 (2016): 369-374. 
73 Scott D. Bennett and Allan Stam, “EUGene: A Conceptual Manual,” International Interactions 26 (2000): 
179-204. Version 3.212.  EUGene software can be accessed at http://www.eugenesoftware.la.psu.edu/. 
74 For my use of ‘major power’, see Correlates of War Project, "State System Membership List, v. 2016," 
Online, http://correlatesofwar.org and “State System Membership List Frequently Asked Questions, Version 
2002.1.” Online, February 21, 2017, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/state-system-membership. For an 
extended discussion of the concept of major power, see Daina Chiba, Carla Martinez Machain, and William Reed, 
“Major Powers and Militarized Conflict,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 58, no. 6 (2014): 976-1002. 
75 If Japan is constitutionally unable to deploy military power, then the country’s armed forces would not 
conduct ‘rehearsals’, but only ‘deterrence’ in self-defense.  Thus, the case of Japan may be partly biased away from 
traditional explanations.  Moreover, according to my data, Japan has only conducted exercises with the US as a 
participant, as opposed to the other major power that conducted (at least some) exercises without the US.  Japan’s 
military reliance on the US calls into question its independence in military doctrine. 
76 Correlates of War Project. 2017. "National Military Capabilities, v5.0." Online, http://correlatesofwar.org.  
See also Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power 
War, 1820-1965," in Bruce Russett ed., Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly Hills: Sage Publication, 1972), 19-48.  
For a discussion of whether India should be included as a great or major power, see Manjeet S. Pardesi, “Is India a 
Great Power? Understanding Great Power Status in Contemporary International Relations,” Asian Security 11, no. 1 
(2015): 1-30. 
77 I gleaned troop-level data from the Correlates of War Project, "National Military Capabilities, v5.0." 
78 See Jensen, Forging the Sword, 5-7. 
79 When the US Army began publishing ADP’s, they also released more specific versions of each manual 
known as Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRP), which were intended to provide more guidance to the 




operations manual by year of publication, the major operating concept, the primary objective of 
the US Army, named threats, and the number of times the words “uncertain” or “uncertainty” are 
used in the manual.  Specifically, the indicator is how often the words “uncertain” or 
“uncertainty” are used in the manual as a proportion of total words.  The major operating 
concept, objectives, and threats are derived from either the preface, introduction, or Chapter 1 of 
each manual, sections which serve as the overarching basis for the rest of the manual.  This 
























                                                          
relatively concise ADPs.  The US army released a new FM 3-0 in the fall of 2017, which will be discussed in the 
conclusion of this article. 
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    The second indicator for uncertainty—‘Post-Cold War Uncertainty”—measures strategic 
uncertainty by differentiating two time periods: the Cold War (1980-1991) and Post-Cold War 
(1992-2016).  As explained in argument section above, the threat environment changed 
considerably after the end of superpower rivalry and the collapse of communism.  Moreover, 
Figure 4 above reveals the change in the US Army’s perception of threats: from specifically the 
Soviet Union and Soviet-backed insurgents during the Cold War to ambiguous, non-state threats 
beginning in the early 1990’s.  This indicator is used to test not only US but all major power 
increases in shaping operations.  My second explanatory variable—habitual military relations—
is coded by including a lagged dependent variable for all the models that do not include random 
effects specifications.80  Below are the two hypotheses I test: 
H1: An increase in doctrinal uncertainty is associated with an increase in the likelihood of 
conducting a shaping exercise with a partner (US Only). 
H2: An increase in post-Cold War uncertainty is associated with an increase in the likelihood of 
conducting a shaping exercise with a partner (US and Non-US). 
    I include several covariates that represent either the alternative explanations or controls for 
other factors that may influence decisions to implement shaping operations.  The first alternative 
explanation—concerning organizational benefits—is indicated through military spending, which 
is the amount of money (in constant 2016 US Dollars) that the major power spent on its military 
for a given year.81  States authorize military expenditures in order for militaries to fund training, 
purchase equipment, and provide wages for military personnel; thus, militaries may seek to 
increase expenditures to enjoy more resources for the organization.  Ally represents the second 
alternative explanation, which indicates whether the partner was an ally as categorized in the 
previous section.  Same region, contiguity, and sovereign history serve as geographic and 
historical controls to determine whether major powers choose local partners or desire to 
institutionalize cooperation with former colonies or republics.82  The outcome, explanatory, and 
control variables are described in Figure 5 below. 
    I use three multinomial logit regression models to test my argument (all with clustered dyad-
years): the first two only includes the US while the third involves all non-US major powers.  
Since the outcome variable is multinomial, I do not apply fixed or random effects. 
                                                          
80 I do not include lagged dependent variables in the models applying random effects specifications since lagged 
DVs cause a unit endogenous effect and bias in these types of models.  See Paul Allison, “Don’t Put Lagged 
Dependent Variables in Mixed Models,” Statistical Horizons, June 2, 2015, https://statisticalhorizons.com/lagged-
dependent-variables. 
81 Military spending is for the entire state military, not just the land-based component that my exercises 
represent.  Specific land-based military expenditures is unavailable; however, total military expenditures should 
serve as a useful proxy for organizational benefits.  Military spending was derived from the Stockholm International 
Peace Research Institute, “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database,” https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex. 
82 Colonial and sovereign history was determined using the Correlates of War Project’s Colonial/Dependency 
Contiguity dataset.  See Correlates of War Project. 2017, "Colonial Contiguity Data, 1816-2016. Version 3.1.” 
Online, http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/colonial-dependency-contiguity. 











    Table 1 below shows the results for the three models according to the value of the dependent 
variable (the first value—no exercise—is the base outcome and is therefore not represented; 
moreover, the other covariates are also repressed for clarity).  Supporting the first hypothesis, 
Model 1 reveals that an increase in doctrinal uncertainty is associated with an increase in the 
probability of conducting a shaping exercise.  When considering the first alternative explanation, 
shaping is associated with a decrease in military spending, which is not puzzling when 
considering that in comparison to traditional exercises, shaping training events are relatively 
small in scale and far less expensive to execute.  Conversely, doctrinal uncertainty is (weakly) 
negatively associated with traditional exercises which means sense considering most of these 
exercises are used to rehearse for missions or deter a known threat.  Moreover, traditional 
exercises are associated with an increase in military spending since these training events are 
much larger in scale and resources than shaping exercises.  Concerning the second alternative, 
although the probability of shaping increases slightly with an ally, traditional exercises are far 
more likely to be carried out between allies (since shaping is more often conducted to recruit 
non-allies).  It is also apparent that states are far more likely to hold an exercise with the US if 
they have done so in the past year, affirming the theory that exercise relations because ‘sticky’ 
over time.  Models 2 and 3 display the results for the second hypothesis in which Post-Cold War 
Uncertainty is the indicator for doctrinal uncertainty (Model 2 for the US and Model 3 for non-
US major powers).  The results are similar to Model 1 with the exception that there is a slight 
positive correlation between military spending and the probability of holding a shaping exercise 
for non-US major powers.  
    Since the dependent variable is a nominal categorical variable, the coefficients for the results 
only indicate the direction and statistical significance for the relationships between the variables.  
Therefore, Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9 below display the marginal effects of each of the explanatory 
variables and covariates on the values of the dependent variable: “N” indicates no exercise, “T” 
indicates a traditional exercise, and “S” indicates a shaping exercise.83  Figure 6 shows the 
positive effect of doctrinal uncertainty on the probability of the US holding a shaping exercise, 
confirming the predictions of the first hypothesis.  Figure 7 displays the marginal effect of the 
two explanatory variables and the alternatives on each of the nominal outcomes for Model 1: a 
standard deviation increase in doctrinal uncertainty is associated with a stronger influence on 
shaping than a previous year’s exercise, military spending, or being an ally.  Figures 8 and 9 
show similar results for Models 2 and 3, respectively, also confirming the results of the 






                                                          
83 Marginal effects plots were developed using the techniques in Long and Freese, Regression Models for 
Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata (College Station: State Press, 2014). 


















   
Doctrinal Uncertainty -0.0198   
 (-0.20)   
Post-Cold War 
Uncertainty 
 -0.0453 -0.351** 
  (-0.24) (-2.84) 
Lag Shaping MME 0.856*** 0.866*** 1.000*** 
 (6.55) (6.82) (15.76) 
Military Spending 1.094** 1.049** 1.116*** 
 (2.68) (2.76) (9.18) 
Ally 3.282*** 3.286*** 3.088*** 




   
Doctrinal Uncertainty 1.116***   
 (16.03)   
Post-Cold War 
Uncertainty 
 3.519*** 3.554*** 
  (6.39) (6.36) 
Lag Shaping MME 0.956*** 0.980*** 1.200*** 
 (9.65) (10.02) (16.13) 
Military Spending -2.850*** -0.127 0.577*** 
 (-9.53) (-0.48) (6.00) 
Ally 1.440*** 1.465*** 1.151*** 
 (9.33) (9.62) (9.67) 
Pseudo-R2 .286 .291 .315 
N 5953 5953 30706 
BIC 5906 5873 13031 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
Table 1: Results for H1 and H2  
  





                




Figure 7: Marginal Effects for Variables (Model 1) 







Figure 8: Marginal Effects for Variables (Model 2) 
 
 
Figure 9: Marginal Effects for Variables (Model 3) 





    The remarkable increase in multinational exercises since the end of the Cold War should alert 
scholars and practitioners alike to the growing need for a more comprehensive understanding of 
military statecraft.  Operations such as multinational exercises, military diplomacy, officer 
exchanges, and military aid should reveal how states use their military to manage diverse threats 
in a complex environment of costly war, emerging great power competition, and the persistent 
threat of violent non-state actors.  Although shaping was a prominent activity of all major powers 
since the end of the Cold War, the apparent return of great power rivalry may raise the question 
about whether shaping to combat non-state actors will continue to be a prominent foreign policy 
tool.  Figure 7 below reveals that traditional exercises are making a comeback in world politics, 
especially as a result of NATO’s exercises as part of the European Reassurance Initiative and 
Operation Atlantic Resolve.  According to my dataset, traditional exercises grew from 9 in 2010 
to 33 in 2016: that is, by a factor of 3.6.  In 2014, the same year in which Russia invaded and 
annexed the Ukrainian province of Crimea, traditional exercises eclipsed shaping for two years 
straight for the first time since 1994.  This return of traditional exercises may encourage scholars 
to retain conventional understandings of military doctrine and power that were developed during 
the Cold War.  Yet what is also interesting about this graph is that both traditional and shaping 




Figure 7: Traditional and Shaping Exercises, 1980-2016 
 




    I anticipate that military exercises, both traditional and shaping, will continue to proliferate for 
three reasons.  First, although some major powers are beginning to become more ‘certain’ about 
their threats (for instance, as expressed in the 2017 US National Security Strategy)84, the 
persistent threat of violent non-state actors seems to be a problem that is difficult to ignore: 
August 2017 Pew Global Attitudes survey, respondents believed that the two greatest threats to 
national security were the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and global climate change 
(Americans and Russians agreed that ISIS posed the greatest threat).85  Second, major powers 
can use shaping exercises as a tool to balance one another.  Recruitment exercises are not only 
useful for gathering support for peacekeeping missions, but can also be leveraged to draw closer 
ties to potential allies in order to balance a major rival.  For instance, the US and Russia appear 
to be supplying and training opposing sides in the conflicts in Ukraine and Syria,86 while Russia 
and China have begun exercise programs with new partners such as Pakistan and Egypt.87  Third, 
due to the habitual nature of military exercises, militaries develop relationships through exercises 
that are difficult to break. 
    Despite the renewed interest in other forms of statecraft—especially economic88—our 
understanding of foreign policy carried out by the military in non-traditional ways is limited; this 
article seeks to shed light on the use of military as a broad tool of diplomacy.89   In order to better 
understand and anticipate the use of military forces to achieve foreign policy ends, both 
traditional and shaping, I argue that the security studies literature explore military statecraft more 
holistically.  The current environment, comprised of a mix of great power competition and the 
persistent threat of non-state actors, necessitates a fresh approach.  Without a better 




                                                          
84 Donald J. Trump, “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America.” Executive Office of the 
President Washington DC, 2017. 
85 Cyber attacks from other countries and the condition of the global economy tied for third, refugee movements 
held fourth, while the influence of the US, Russia, and China ranked lower.  Pew Research Center, “Globally, 
People Point to ISIS and Climate Change as Leading Security Threats,” August 1, 2017, 
www.pewglobal.org/2017/08/01/gobally-people-point-to-isis-and-climate-change-as-leading-security-threats. 
86 Samuel Charap, “The Ghost of Hybrid War,” Survival, Vol. 57, No. 6 (December 2015- January 2016): 51-
58. 
87 For instance, Russia and Pakistan held their first joint exercise in 2016 and plan on holding exercises 
annually.  See Franz-Stefan Gady, “Russia and Pakistan to Hold First Ever Military Exercise,” The Diplomat, 
September 14, 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/russia-and-pakistan-to-hold-first-ever-military-exercise/. 
88 See, for instance, William J. Norris, Chinese Economic Statecraft: Commercial Actors, Grand Strategy, and 
State Control (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2017); Cynthia Roberts, Leslie Armijo, and Saori Katada, The 
BRICS and Collective Financial Statecraft (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Robert D. Blackwill and 
Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2016). 
89 Other scholars have pointed to the need for a better understanding of military exercises; see Beatrice Heuser 
and Harold Simpson, “The Missing Political Dimension of Military Exercises,” RUSI Journal 162, No. 3 (June/July 
2017): 20-28.  Although there have been some attempts to better understand the use of exercises to achieve political 
goals, there have been few comprehensive studies to date.  For a recent assessment of certain major exercises, see 
Beatrice Heuser, Tormod Heier, and Guillaume Lasconjarias, eds., Military Exercises: Political Messaging and 
Strategic Impact, NATO Defence College Forum Paper 26, 2018, 
http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1157. 








Figure A.1: Multinational Exercises by Major Power, 1980-2016 (NATO and Non-NATO 
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